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Book Reviews
Neo-orthodoxy in Academic Freedom
FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM.
By Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post. New Haven, Connecticut
and London, United Kingdom: Yale University Press, 2009. 263 pages.
$27.50.
SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME. By Stanley Fish. New York, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 189 pages. $19.95.

Reviewed by J. Peter Byrne*
A robust system of academic freedom protects the most important
values and functions of higher education. The scholar’s freedom to choose
topics and methods of investigation and the teacher’s ability to shape
assignments and pedagogy, subject to the criteria of their fields and the
evaluation of their peers, have provided the necessary conditions for the
intellectual success of American higher education. Yet, how poorly
understood and feebly defended has been this indispensable norm of academic life! Smug indifference of professors, extravagant claims by
defenders, bad faith or paranoid criticisms by outsiders, epistemological
skepticism, and the boom and bust economic fortunes of our many and various colleges and universities have combined to cast a pall of doubt and
distrust over this signal achievement of our intellectual culture.
These two books, so different in tone and moral orientation, embrace a
common strategy: they protect academic freedom against contemporary
threats by grounding it in its original function of protecting professorial control over the evaluation of teaching and scholarship. Stanley Fish, literary
theorist, Milton scholar, polymath academic controversialist, dean, and now
NYTimes.com columnist, argues colorfully and vigorously for professors to
fulfill only their jobs of instruction and scholarship, leaving political persuasion and moral guidance to others, or at least to their own spare time.
Matthew Finkin and Robert Post, eminent law professors and veteran leaders
in the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), calmly
explain and defend the AAUP’s approach to protecting the academic
freedom of professors through investigation and judgment. Both books take
as foundational the AAUP’s famous 1915 Declaration of Principles on
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks for helpful comments to
Robin West, Karen Byrne, and participants at a summer workshop at Georgetown Law.
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Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,1 although they take different
interpretative stances toward the 1915 Declaration’s prim defense of professorial competence against meddling trustees. Both books react to external
critics and gesture toward internal reforms of our vast, wonderful, and paradoxical structure of higher education. I term their positions “neo-orthodoxy”
because they reground academic freedom in the original AAUP tradition,
updating its rationale to some extent for current intellectual assumptions and
defending it against rival contemporary accounts and external criticisms.2 As
will be seen, I largely agree with this move but have concerns about how to
give it effect within the law.
This Review seeks to both celebrate and criticize these books.
Curiously, these books that praise the norms of scholarship cannot be
considered themselves to constitute scholarship. Though smart and learned,
they do not place themselves within the existing literature or confront recalcitrant data. Rather, they make arguments to persuade general readers, even
if ones within the academy. Indeed, they stimulate a discussion that all who
care about universities should join. This Review first provides some background about academic freedom and the tradition these books revive.
Second, it assesses how well they address internal doubts and external criticisms. Third, it considers the implications of their arguments for ongoing
and looming questions about the constitutional status of academic freedom.
My goal, like theirs, is to strengthen academic freedom for an uncertain
future.
I.

Academic Freedom as a Professional Norm

Academic freedom exists both as a reasonably determinate academic
norm and as some kind of constitutional right. The norm has grown from the
crucial pronouncements of the AAUP and the commitment to it by nearly
every entity within the world of higher education. University faculty,
administrators, and trustees largely have internalized this ethic of academic
freedom, however shaky their understanding of its premises and reach.

1. Finkin and Post print an abridged version of the 1915 Declaration as an appendix to their
book. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915) [hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION], as reprinted in
MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN
ACADEMIC FREEDOM app.1 (2009). For convenience, I will cite to that version in this Review. The
complete 1915 Declaration is published in the AAUP collection commonly known as the
“Redbook.” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915), reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS app.1
(10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter REDBOOK].
2. The analogy I have in mind is the neo-orthodox theology associated with Reinhold Niebuhr,
which sought at once to fend off fundamentalists on one side and those liberals on the other who
dissolved the distinctive perspective of the Christian tradition. See GARY DORRIEN, THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN MODERN LIBERAL THEOLOGY: IDEALISM, REALISM, AND MODERNITY, 1900–1950,
at 459–64 (2003) (illustrating how Niebuhr distinguished his position from both the liberal Chicago
school and conservative Barthian positions).
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Committee A of the AAUP continues to expound its meaning through occasional statements but even more importantly through investigations and
reports about specific complaints.3 The core of the scholarly norm of academic freedom is that nonacademics such as trustees and administrators
should refrain from interfering with scholarship and teaching, and leave
evaluation of academic quality to scholarly peers (i.e., other professors primarily within the relevant discipline). The individual faculty member thus
enjoys freedom to choose subjects and methods for research, publication, and
teaching, constrained primarily by the expectations and structures of the profession. The norm presumes that the function of a scholar is to search for
truth, which will redound to the benefit of society at large, and that lay interference for political or other motives will distort or derail the scholarly
enterprise. These general propositions command near universal allegiance,
but the application of them to marginal cases generates disagreement and
sometimes passion.
The constitutional right has been more obscure and accepted only
gingerly. It dates only to Sweezy v. New Hampshire4 in 1957, where the
Supreme Court invalidated on cryptic grounds a contempt conviction against
a visiting classroom lecturer for refusing to answer questions posed by the
state attorney general about the political content of his lecture. The Court
stressed, however, the “grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion
into the intellectual life of a university.”5 Primarily, constitutional academic
freedom has shielded the university as an institution from government meddling with core academic decisions, which has protected the autonomous
operation of the norm within universities.6 Commentators disagree about
whether the Constitution incorporates the norm itself so that aggrieved
faculty can seek resolution of disputes with their institutions about the
substance of academic freedom in federal courts.7 This question has become
much more pressing since the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos8

3.
4.
5.
6.

REDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1.
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989) (“In the last decade, the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning academic
freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the university itself—
understood in its corporate capacity—largely to be free from government interference in the
performance of core educational functions.”); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two
Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1265, 1322 (1988) (concluding
that the centerpiece of the constitutional definition of academic freedom is institutional autonomy).
7. Compare David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional”
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 280 (1990)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s designation of institutional academic freedom as a First
Amendment right does not support the inference that the Court has rejected a constitutional right of
individual professors against “trustees, administrators, and faculty peers”), with Byrne, supra
note 6, at 329 (defining the constitutional incarnation of academic freedom such that it includes only
the core academic affairs of the university itself and not the autonomy of individual faculty).
8. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

146

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 88:143

that the First Amendment does not protect government employees against
employer reprisals for speech within their official duties, while postponing
consideration whether such a rule should apply to university teaching and
scholarship.9
Both books under review here address academic freedom as a norm or
ethical principle more than as a constitutional matter. They offer almost no
analysis of legal or structural issues. But they undertake their expositions in
light of these legal uncertainties. After engaging them on their own terms, I
will consider the implications their approaches have for outstanding legal
controversies.
The centrality of the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration for any discussion of
academic freedom has long been recognized. Academic freedom was in
some real sense invented and fostered by the AAUP, initially an organization
of academic elites formed primarily for that purpose.10 The 1915
Declaration addressed the situation of emerging universities at the beginning
of the twentieth century: professors employing sophisticated, modern research methodologies sought professional stature in institutions legally
controlled by lay trustees sometimes suspicious of the political or religious
tendencies of modern thought. It conceived of knowledge as objective and
politically neutral. Good progressives of their era, the authors of the 1915
Declaration founded academic freedom upon the positive structures of
scientific inquiry, arguing that professors should present their research either
in scholarship or the classroom without influence from untoward motives and
be evaluated by other professionals solely on the academic value of their
work. Trustees were admonished to treat the university as a public trust and
refrain from injecting their political or other ideological prejudices into academic matters. Public opinion was treated as a threat to the advancement of
knowledge, particularly at state universities. Universities were to be
“inviolable refuge[s] from such tyranny” and “intellectual experiment
station[s], where new ideas may germinate.”11
The 1915 Declaration did not view academic freedom as establishing a
personal freedom of expression for professors, but only the right to engage in
professional speech within a discipline without extraneous restraint. “The
claim to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the
progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore, only those who carry on their
work in the temper of the scientific inquirer who may justly assert this
claim.”12 Personal views of the professor, divorced from disciplinary

9. Id. at 425.
10. The authors adapted ideas current in Germany, just as did developing research universities
more broadly, to the quite different conditions of higher education in the United States. RICHARD
HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 385–89 (1955).
11. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 172.
12. Id. at 173.
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expertise, or expressed in the classroom in an educationally incompetent
manner would not count, although speech by professors outside their professional sphere was gingerly extended protection so long as they refrained from
“hasty or unverified or exaggerated statements,” as well as “intemperate or
sensational modes of expression.”13 The 1915 Declaration predated any
modern First Amendment doctrine and applied equally to public and private
schools.
The 1915 Declaration anticipated that its academic goals would be
accomplished by internal structural reforms, primarily peer review and
tenure. The growing professionalism of academic life and increasing competition for eminence pushed leading universities to incorporate these
reforms and the scholarly aspirations that inspired them. Acceptance of the
AAUP position in fact soon reached a tipping point so that failure to formally
embrace or adhere to its core marked a school as marginal or maverick. In
1940, the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges issued the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, a brief, joint
statement of basic principles, which soon gained approval by hundreds of
educational associations and has been incorporated in many faculty
handbooks.14
Although the model of higher education embedded in the 1915
Declaration and the 1940 Statement prevailed through midcentury, it began
to show strain under the dramatic changes affecting higher education
thereafter. The higher education sector grew massively, both in the number
and diversity of students and employees, as well as in the subjects taught and
researched, and in the economic significance and social prestige of university
degrees. The federal government became far more enmeshed in higher education financing and regulation. As the size of the faculty has grown, the
percentage covered by tenure systems has decreased. In all, universities have
become far more the loci of political struggles, through McCarthyism, the
Sixties, revolutions in racial and sexual diversity, and the culture wars. The
traditional focus of the 1915 Declaration on the relations between faculty
and trustees could seem quaint compared to new claims, frequently in court,
about government interventions, political protests, affirmative action, and
politicization of departments. The AAUP has developed thoughtful statements on many of these issues, but it has become one voice among many,
distracted by unionization disputes, and weakened by internal dissension.15
Both books largely ignore changes in the size, scope, and social context of

13. Id. at 177–78.
14. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS (1970) [hereinafter 1940
STATEMENT], reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 1, at 3.
15. See Robin Wilson, The AAUP, 92 and Ailing, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.),
June 8, 2007, available at http://chronicle.com/article/The-AAUP-92Ailing/3053 (discussing the
split in membership opinions regarding the desirability of the AAUP continuing to function as a
union).
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higher education, and concentrate on more direct conceptual challenges to
academic freedom.16
Both books embrace the essence of the 1915 Declaration, understanding
scholarship as the production of knowledge shaped by relevant disciplines.
Fish claims to be “merely rephrasing” the 1915 Declaration.17 He writes,
“My deflationary definition of academic freedom is narrowly professional
rather than philosophical, and its narrowness, I contend, enables it to provide
clear answers to questions . . . blurred by more ambitious definitions.”18
Finkin and Post’s whole argument builds on the 1915 Declaration, which
they describe as the first and “arguably the greatest” articulation of the professional norm of academic freedom.19 They both understand teaching to be
enabling students to consider the truth of complex ideas using critical
methods. Finkin and Post write, “[I]t is precisely the pedagogical purpose of
higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their
own ideas.”20 Fish claims, “If you’re not in the pursuit-of-truth business, you
should not be in the university.”21
Finkin and Post provide a lawyerly account of what the AAUP has
considered to be academic freedom, giving a clear if unoriginal account of
the 1915 Declaration, emphasizing the context in which it was adopted, and
then summarizing investigation reports by Committee A that bear upon the
controversies of our time. They describe this accumulated body of
Committee A reports as “the most authoritative available source for the
professional meaning of academic freedom today.”22 Their distillation of
these reports may be the greatest contribution of the book. There is a substantial amount of nuanced wisdom buried among lengthy, painstaking
accounts of otherwise forgotten academic imbroglios. The reports themselves are not readily accessible, having been published in old issues of
AAUP publications, so the authors are engaged in a kind of salvage operation. The approach and principles set forth could guide thinking about
academic freedom even if Committee A were to disappear. Such a
distillation, however, obscures the centrality of Committee A’s factual
inquiry and its focus on structural remedies for institutional failures, usually
recommending greater faculty participation at some decision point.
Finkin and Post accomplish two objectives here. First, they present an
unusually comprehensive account of the norm of academic freedom by
describing Committee A decisions on difficult points. In this they resemble
16. See generally Andrew Delbanco, The Universities in Trouble, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 14,
2009, at 36, 38 (analyzing how the financial crisis has impacted higher education and magnified
“the widening disparity of wealth and opportunity in American society”).
17. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 80 (2008).
18. Id. at 16.
19. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 30.
20. Id. at 105.
21. FISH, supra note 17, at 20.
22. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 52.
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common law treatise authors extracting rules of law from the reports of
cases. Second, they convey the impression that the AAUP approach employs
nuanced and dispassionate wisdom remote from contemporary ideological
divides. The AAUP principles thus gain an aura of authoritative objectivity
because they transcend today’s partisanship.
Their approach can be illustrated by an important example: they offer
several cases concerning the limits on faculty discretion to introduce into the
classroom controversial matter having no relation to the subject matter of the
course. In one case, a professor at Evansville College frequently referred to
contemporary political disputes to illustrate logical fallacies, conveying in
the process a personal aversion to President Truman and an allegiance to
Henry Wallace.23 Committee A rejected claims that the professor used his
philosophy classroom for propaganda because his statements were in aid of
stimulating discussion on matters properly within the sphere of the class.24 It
wrote:
[J]udgments concerning the handling of controversial material will
frequently depend not so much on the what as the how. . . . The total
effect of what a teacher says on controversial subjects in the classroom
depends a great deal upon the manner, the spirit in which he says it,
and the emphasis he places upon it. It depends also upon the previous
existence of a relationship of confidence and understanding between
the teacher and his students.25
Finkin and Post then relate the fate of another professor teaching a class
in the history of American foreign policy at Ohio State, who reacted to the
assassination of Martin Luther King by dropping his topic, speaking for
forty-five minutes about the assassination, and then burning his draft card.26
Committee A concluded that the professor had “no right to commandeer the
class for a ‘teach-in’ on his personal political views.”27 Based on these and
other cases, Finkin and Post argue for an underlying principle:
A pedagogical intervention bears a “relation” to a subject under
consideration if it is educationally relevant. . . . The standard is
whether material from a seemingly foreign field of study illuminates
the subject matter under scrutiny, bearing in mind that the overall
design of a modern curriculum is to provide a general education,
which is to say, the ability to think systemically and in an independent
and informed manner.28

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 93.
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The authors thus treat Committee A decisions and opinions as authority.
Their role is to explain the underlying principles, which they present as
having normative weight.
Fish, by contrast, argues passionately for a vision of teaching that he
terms, “academicizing.”29 He would limit the aspirations of the university
teacher to training students in the intellectual practices pertinent to their subject and exclude all extraneous ideological debate.
College and university teachers can (legitimately) do two things:
(1) introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry
that had not previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip
those same students with the analytical skills—of argument, statistical
modeling, laboratory procedure—that will enable them to move
confidently within those traditions and to engage in independent
research after a course is over.30
Fish argues that teachers should not attempt more than this; in particular,
they should not attempt to guide or instruct students to follow moral or political principles, “tasks that belong properly to other agents—to preachers,
political leaders, therapists, and gurus.”31 He denies that teachers have
competence for these roles and, more persuasively, that doing so can embroil
academia in controversy.
Fish’s account of academic freedom builds upon this “deflationary” or
minimalist account of the role of the university teacher and tracks a narrow
reading of the 1915 Declaration. He argues that only academics can have
competent views on issues within academic disciplines, so lay constraints on
genuinely academic work can only impair the discipline and are as illegitimate as they are unnecessary.32 He characterizes academic freedom as “the
freedom to do one’s academic job without interference from external constituencies like legislators, boards of trustees, donors, and even parents.”33 On
the other hand, professors have no warrant for ever discussing issues outside
their subjects in class and no special protection for doing so outside. “[O]ne
violates academic freedom by deciding to set aside academic purposes for
others thought to be more noble or urgent.”34 While Fish seems largely
uninterested in issues of institutional design, he seems to feel that professors
who stay within the lines he draws should be protected absolutely, while
those who go outside them can and should be checked by institutional
authorities.
While Finkin and Post articulate standards that can encompass different
approaches and circumstances, Fish writes from personal conviction to
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

FISH, supra note 17, at 26.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id. at 81.
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persuade individuals to agree with his approach. Their differences can be
seen in their disagreement about whether a professor may advocate personal
views on controversial subjects in class. Fish argues never; he would limit
teachers to analysis or contextualization of arguments advanced by others.35
If an idea or a policy is presented as a candidate for allegiance—aided
by the instructor, students are to decide where they stand on the
matter—then the classroom has been appropriated for partisan
purposes. But if an idea or a policy is subjected to a certain kind of
interrogation—what is its history? how has it changed over time?
who are its prominent proponents? what are the arguments for and
against it? with what other policies is it usually packaged?—then its
partisan thrust will have been blunted, for it will have become an
object of analysis rather than an object of affection.36
While he claims to draw a workable line between teaching about a
subject and using it as an occasion for political mobilization, he advances the
extreme view that, for example, neither faculty nor students addressing the
ethics of withdrawing life support from a vegetative patient or assessing the
Bush presidency should advocate positions on the issues but instead should
examine the nature of the question and of the arguments advanced by
others.37
[A]s this is happening—as the subject is being academicized—there
will be less and less pressure in this class to come down on one side or
the other and more and more pressure to describe accurately and fully
the historical and philosophical antecedents of both sides. . . . Not
only is it possible to depoliticize issues that have obvious political
content; it is easy.38
Finkin and Post largely agree with Fish, writing that “it is precisely the
pedagogical purpose of higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their own ideas.”39 They argue, however, that faculty
should “be free to structure and discuss classroom material as they deem
most pedagogically effective, so long as they do not indoctrinate their students or violate professional standards of pedagogical relevance and
substantive competence.”40 They explicitly accept that strong faculty advocacy on controversial subjects in the classroom meets “the heuristic necessity
of actively arousing student attention and interest.”41 Finkin and Post start

35. Id. at 24–25.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 27–28. He argues that what makes great ethical writers, such as Plato or William
James, “worth studying” is not their substantive views but “the verbal, architectonic, or
argumentative skills they display.” Id. at 102–03. Plato and James certainly would be disappointed.
38. Id. at 28.
39. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 105.
40. Id. at 104.
41. Id. at 94. Finkin and Post also quote from an earlier article:
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from the same point that students should not be indoctrinated, but they move
to the broader principle that university faculty should teach students to think
for themselves. They claim that the 1915 Declaration presupposes a particular “pedagogical purpose . . . to instill in students the mature independence
of mind that characterizes successful adulthood.”42 They argue, however,
that different professors properly advance this goal in very different ways:
some refrain from revealing their own views; others state them forcefully and
invite debate. “It is difficult if not dangerous to attempt to lay down bright
and abstract rules because the quality of the connection that professors forge
with their students depends so heavily on individual style and personality.”43
These excerpts capture both the shared values and different approaches
of these two books. Both view higher education as liberal education, which
teaches students to think carefully and competently for themselves. Fish
argues emphatically in the first person for drawing strict limits around
academic competence. His prose snaps and sizzles, but sacrifices nuance for
vigor. He lacks any institutional perspective or tolerance for divergence
from his precepts. Finkin and Post, on the other hand, present themselves as
the impersonal expositors of an old and successful tradition. Because they
wisely view academic freedom as a regulatory norm that must apply in various contexts, they seek to provide flexible standards that embrace a range of
pedagogical approaches.
They proscribe teaching that amounts to
“indoctrination” rather than prescribe how everyone should teach. While
their arguments shine less brightly than Fish’s, they also seem more sensible
and workable. They seem to address Fish directly when they argue that
judgments about inappropriate teaching are “necessarily contextual” and
“cannot be governed by mechanical and inflexible rules.”44
II.

Considering Postmodernism

One project both books share is burying the notion that the
epistemological skepticism associated with postmodernism threatens
academic freedom. The authors of the 1915 Declaration expressed conventional views of their time about the objectivity of the scientific method and
the solidity and neutrality of the knowledge gained thereby. Peer review
insulated from external political control was justified by the commitment to

There is no academic norm that prohibits scholarship from communicating definite
viewpoints about important and controversial questions, like democracy, human rights,
or the welfare state. Faculty must be free to communicate these viewpoints in their
pedagogy. Political passion is in fact the engine that drives some of the best
scholarship and teaching[,] . . . and this is particularly true in the humanities and social
sciences.
Id. at 202 n.1 (quoting Robert C. Post, Academic Freedom and the “Intifada Curriculum,”
ACADEME, May–June 2003, at 16, 19).
42. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 61.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 99.
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truth of those trained in disciplinary methods, as compared with the selfinterest and ideology of outsiders.45 As theorists have argued persuasively
about the situatedness of understanding and the influence of convention and
social power in knowledge,46 the confidence of the AAUP pioneers has
seemed naïve. Some powerful voices have argued that academic freedom
needs to get along without reliance on any claim that scholarship advances
knowledge toward an external goal of truth.47 Defenders of academic freedom have worried whether academic freedom can survive without some
persuasive warrant that scholarly knowledge rests on something other than
institutional inertia.48 These concerns have been heightened by campaigns
from the right demanding that faculties reflect political balance and diversity
of viewpoint; their arguments often reflect at least tactical appropriations of
postmodern skepticism.
Finkin and Post worry that such skepticism about the bases for
disciplinary criteria and a concomitant concern for those who dissent from
the prevailing paradigms has pushed understandings of academic freedom
away from protection of peer review and toward protection of individual
voices. They express the fear that such “antinomianism” will erode public
respect for faculty self-governance. “The external defense of academic freedom will collapse if faculty lose faith in the professional norms necessary to
define and generate knowledge.”49 Their response to this threat is pragmatic;
universities should adhere to an understanding of academic freedom based on
protection of peer review because only that will nurture public faith in

45. The 1915 Declaration exhibits at least two attitudes that lack credibility today: expansive
optimism about what the social sciences can discover, and the claim that social scientists deserve
deference because they stand apart from political interests. “[I]f the universities are to render any
such service toward the right solution of the social problems of the future, it is the first essential that
the scholars who carry on the work of the universities shall not be in a position of dependence upon
the favor of any social class or group, that the disinterestedness and impartiality of their inquiries
and their conclusions shall be, so far as is humanly possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.” 1915
DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 169–70.
46. The literature on this is voluminous, but the key work is THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURES OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
47. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Academic Norms, Contemporary Challenges: A Reply to Robert
Post on Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 107, 126–28
(Beshara Doumani ed., 2006) (arguing that the external-truth-driven conception of academic
freedom is simply one of a competing pool of professional norms, many of which are dissenting and
all of which must be subject to criticism and debate); Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have
Philosophical Presuppositions?, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 21, 21–27 (Louis
Menand ed., 1996) (arguing that belief in an objective truth is not presupposed by the practices of
academic freedom and that adopting sociopolitical justifications for academic freedom will lead to
more honest and clear-headed inquiry than currently exists under the epistemological justifications).
48. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 286–88 (noting that if, as some have argued, academic speech
on any subject is merely political speech then academic freedom would be only the result of inertia
and traditionalism); David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 47)
(questioning whether academic freedom can survive without its historic epistemological support and
arguing that the essays in Menand’s book fail to provide a satisfactory answer).
49. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 60.
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professional norms. Moreover, universities actually have structures of peer
review and historically have acted as if these structures advance knowledge.
While Finkin and Post acknowledge that the public will support such faculty
prerogatives only if they “over time produce credible forms of knowledge,”
they seem to argue for internal adherence to these norms primarily to
promote external deference to them.50
Practically speaking, I believe that they are correct. I have written: “If
[academic] speech is believed to have no autonomy from political power,
political power will not long brook contradictory speech.”51 But it is disappointing that Finkin and Post do not offer a more substantive defense of the
pursuit of truth as the basis for academic freedom. Their argument rests too
heavily on the self-interest of the academic community in keeping public
interference at bay. They seem to argue that we need to hold onto ideas of
truth in order to protect academic freedom, whereas we need academic freedom because all scholarship presupposes a goal of truer knowledge that may
conflict with prevailing ideology.52
Scholarship, in fact, has largely digested postmodernism. Chastened
from absolute claims or assumptions about objective truth and alert to
methodological limitations, scholars continue to attempt to give more
satisfying accounts of the problems recognized within or among their disciplines. On the one hand, scholars do not need conclusive philosophical
accounts of what truth means in scholarly pursuits to recognize that careful
and accurate work can improve existing accounts of issues without regard to
their political tendency. Fish writes that one can fully accept postmodernism
and “still hold firmly to judgments of truth, accuracy, correctness, and error
as they are made in the precincts of some particular realm of inquiry.”53 On
the other, contemporary philosophers do provide impressive nonfoundationalist accounts of knowledge that emphasize the very ethical practices of
honesty, accuracy, and critique that characterize scholarly work.54 It is hard
to see why we should lose confidence because we view knowledge as

50. Id. at 61.
51. Byrne, supra note 6, at 287.
52. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 125
(2004) (“[I]t seems likely that such institutional arrangements will and, perhaps, should decay
without the animating vitality of hard truth as a goal and test for academic discourse.”).
53. FISH, supra note 17, at 134.
54. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS (2002) (reconciling the
tension between demanding truthfulness while rejecting notions of absolute truth, and providing an
account of knowledge that relies heavily on the importance of accuracy and sincerity); MICHAEL
WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY (2001)
(arguing for a contextualist theory of knowledge, which recognizes that knowledge arises in
community endeavors such as academic disciplines). I discuss the importance of this work for
academic freedom in Byrne, supra note 52, at 124–29. Arguments for epistemic relativism, which
posits that claims to truth can be validated only within epistemic systems that themselves cannot be
justified by external criteria, are skewered in PAUL A. BOGHASSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE:
AGAINST RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 81–110 (2006).
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provisional rather than absolute, or disciplinary criteria as revisable rather
than final. On the contrary, this “pragmatic realism” about knowledge makes
persuasive a neo-orthodox account of academic freedom based upon the
value of professional standards.55
Fish grasps concerns about postmodernism by both lapels. He
recognizes that external pressure groups for political balance both criticize
and rely upon postmodernism. His main argument, however, is that epistemological skepticism is irrelevant to the truth value of scholarship and
reflects only minor adjustments in certain disciplinary norms. Fish long has
argued for the primacy of disciplinary norms in providing the necessary selfunderstandings of any intellectual practice.56 Here, he gets traction through
his larger strategy of minimizing the claims about what teaching or scholarship can accomplish.
[O]bjectivity is just another name for trying to get something right in a
particular area of inquiry. . . . [T]he researcher begins in some context
of practice, with its received authorities, sacred texts, exemplary
achievements, and generally accepted benchmarks, and from within
the perspective (and not within the perspective of a general theory) of
that context—thick, interpersonal, densely elaborated—judges
something to be true or inaccurate, reasonable or irrational, and so
on.57
Fish thus deploys his academic minimalism, which separates academic
practices from any larger social value. He argues that the conventional,
historically situated criteria of merit operative in any academic discipline
have no necessary relation to any broader notion of truth. Invocations of
general truth or morality by outsiders are simply irrelevant to the specific
practices and professional criteria of insiders. Indeed, he goes so far as to
claim (implausibly) that “[t]here is no necessary or even likely correlation
between the political views of a faculty member and the views he or she may
have on a disputed issue in an academic field.”58 Moreover, he argues rather
subtly that deconstruction is an ancient and normal mental process, “a
practice engaged in by anyone who for some reason is struck by the oddity of

55. Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob provide a pithy definition of practical realism:
Practical realists are stuck in a contingent world, using language to point to objects
outside themselves about which they can be knowledgeable because they use
language. . . . More important, practical realism thwarts the relativists by reminding
them that some words and conventions, however socially constructed, reach out to the
world and give a reasonably true description of its contents.
JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT & MARGARET JACOB, TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 250
(1994).
56. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 238–42 (1994) (arguing that although disciplinary boundaries are artificial, they are
necessary insofar as they provide the conditions that make academic discourse possible).
57. FISH, supra note 17, at 139–40.
58. Id. at 145.
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a piece of behavior accepted uncritically by society.”59 Fish is a postmodernist who clings to disciplinary norms as structures that make sense in a sea of
general incoherence or at least radically inconsistent perspectives. This gives
his argument a curious cast: he embraces disciplinary practices while
disclaiming any interest in justifying them before any external standard.
There is much to admire in Fish’s argument and in the rhetoric that
advances it. He normalizes postmodernism—his humor gently mocking fear
of the abyss. He makes disciplinary norms seem more like valuable signposts rather than betrayals of some larger truth, more havens of coherence
than structures of oppression. He contributes to a neo-orthodox defense of
academic freedom as properly resting on the autonomy of scholarship by
providing a twist to the long-standing claim that scholarship should be understood as autonomous from lay opinion. Rather than relying on a
scientistic belief that scholarship has a privileged relation to objective Truth
unavailable to laymen, he argues that it has its own truths coherent and
relevant only to insiders. The trick has been to reestablish a claim to
academic self-governance against a vastly different epistemological
background.
But his academic minimalism has the same defects here as elsewhere in
his book. Fish insists that higher education has no social value, no
“extracurricular payoff.”60 In response to suggestions that a liberal education
will foster economic, political, or cultural values, his answer is “no, no,
no.”61 He insists that “fashioning citizens for a pluralistic society has nothing
to do with the pursuit of truth.”62 He argues further that any such benefits
would be only “the unintended consequences of an enterprise which, if it is
to remain true to itself, must be entirely self-referential, must be stuck on
itself, must have no answer whatsoever to the question, ‘what good is it?’”63
Fish seems here to conflate persuasive arguments for the inherent value of
liberal education, such as classically articulated by John Henry Newman,
with the tendentious corollary that it has no extrinsic or social value.64 He
makes two serious mistakes.

59. Id. at 137.
60. Id. at 55.
61. Id. at 54.
62. Id. at 120.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Fish rather casually appropriates Newman, acknowledging, “Cardinal Newman[’s]
formulation . . . anticipates everything I have written here.” Id. at 177. Newman certainly defined
liberal education to be the training of the intellect for its own sake, but, unlike Fish, he also
advocated it both for what it gave the student and for what it contributed to society. He thought that
a liberal education could develop the character of a “gentleman,” that it engendered, “a cultivated
intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in
the conduct of life.” JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 89 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1899). Newman also defended it for its broad usefulness in society: “[A]
cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work
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First, American higher education is imbedded in a democratic society,
upon which it depends for financial, moral, and political support. The unique
legal structure of the American university, where legal control rests with lay
trustees, encapsulates this tension.65 This arrangement developed at the very
beginning because of the difficulty of founding new schools without
resources,66 but it also expressed a Protestant urge for lay control over the
clerical privilege that characterized faculty-governed English universities.67
Similarly, the spur to state universities provided by the Morrill Act68 and
many subsequent federal programs and the historic generosity of state legislatures have always been justified by the contributions to the practical value
of new and more widely dispersed knowledge.69 Such structures indicate that
academic work must always justify itself to the wider public. If academic
practices have no relation to larger concerns of life, why should a trustee,
taxpayer, or parent provide resources to carry them on? The professional
norm of academic freedom mediates between the scholar’s need to pursue
academic criteria as ends in themselves and the public’s desire to secure
socially valuable outcomes. Indeed, public support for academic freedom
rests on the belief that giving faculty their professional freedom will result in
valuable knowledge and a better prepared citizenry. Finkin and Post correctly argue, “In the long run, public support for academic freedom will
endure as long as the public need for the creation of such knowledge.”70
Second, Fish is wrong that a liberal education does not contribute to
developing citizenship. A pluralistic and democratic society can be
distinguished from a fundamentalist or authoritarian one by persistent,
and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number.” Id.
at 119.
65. Fish’s rigid disjuncture between academic work and wider values also leads him to make
some repulsive arguments about university governance. He argues against universities making any
ethical judgments in their nonacademic operations, such as retailing embossed merchandise
produced by sweated labor. “[B]usiness questions . . . should be decided in business terms, not in
terms of global equity.” FISH, supra note 17, at 31. Maintenance workers should be paid “the
lowest possible wages.” Id. Such practices would soon alienate both internal and external
constituencies upon which universities depend.
66. See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 951–52 (2009) (describing
how early American universities did not follow the English model of faculty governing boards
simply because there were not enough scholars in the New World to reproduce it).
67. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]n America nonscholars retained the right to
decide what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be published.”).
68. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–308
(2006)). The Act provided federal land grants to states to develop universities “where the leading
object shall be . . . to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic
arts . . . .” 7 U.S.C. § 304.
69. On the historic role of utilitarian goals in higher education, see LAWRENCE R. VEYSEY, THE
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 57–120 (1965).
70. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 42; see also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB
417 (2001) (claiming that American society has accepted the AAUP’s position that it should abstain
from interfering in university affairs out of its own self-interest in preserving disinterested
scholarship).
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competing arguments about both ends and means, respect for facts, and a
willingness to revise assumptions. Commitments to rationality and freedom
necessarily intertwine. A liberal education aims to teach people to engage
arguments independently and critically, to separate good reasons from
bullshit,71 and, crucially, to be open to revise their own positions upon
learning new facts or hearing persuasive arguments.72 These are the methods
of every academic discipline and essential learning for the leaders in the kind
of society we wish to be.73 Students studying Milton with Professor Fish will
learn the sophisticated questions and methods of contemporary literary
criticism, but they also will learn more generally how to make and critique
arguments about their cultural tradition. The Supreme Court’s “special
concern” for academic freedom may well be based on such a view.74 Justice
Brennan wrote, “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . ‘rather than any kind of
authoritative selection.’”75 Chief Justice Warren also wrote, “Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.”76 Such statements, as well as innumerable others delivered by
university presidents over the years, employ a somewhat hyperbolic rhetoric.
But they also convey a faith that the methods of scholarship and education
within the university provide a crucial model for thinking and discourse and
training for participation in a liberal society. The university is a holy place
for a liberal society, one where the larger society’s values about discourse
and knowledge are observed in a purer manner, which serves both as a
release from and reproach to the compromised realities of politics and
interests.77 Fish offers an impoverished defense of higher education by
denying its social value.
71. See generally HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005) (describing “bullshit” as a
distinctive form of misrepresentation).
72. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF
REFORM IN LIBERAL EDUCATION, 36 (1997) (“Logical analysis is at the heart of democratic
political culture.”).
73. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 335–38 (espousing the value liberal education contributes to
society). The literature on this is vast, from Thomas Jefferson to Amy Gutmann. See, e.g.,
THOMAS JEFFERSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
(1818), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 457, 459–60 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)
(listing various objects of education, including the need “[t]o develop the reasoning faculties of our
youth, enlarge their minds, cultivate their morals, and instill into them the precepts of virtue and
order”); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 172–93 (1987) (extolling the democratic
purposes served by higher education).
74. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”).
75. Id.
76. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
77. Amy Gutmann aptly captures the analogous theme of serving democracy by being set aside
from it:
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III. Responding to Critics
Both books embrace the 1915 Declaration’s emphasis on scholarly
expertise to deflect or refute criticism of university faculties for leftist bias.
Complaints about “tenured radicals” have waxed and waned for two decades
now, to some extent within the university but far more virulently from
outside.78 Rightist pundits have gained traction in public opinion by
combining hair-raising anecdotes about faculty politicizing classrooms with
caricatures of postmodernism that reduce it to claims that all knowledge
represents structures of oppression by powerful entities.79 Whatever the
merits of specific complaints, the overall impetus seems more part of a larger
political and cultural struggle than considered critiques of new trends in
scholarship and teaching.80 Some critics have argued that state legislators
and trustees need to step in to restore traditional academic values abandoned
by faculty themselves. They have advocated for legislative or administrative
mandates that faculties represent the entire political spectrum and that

Universities are more likely to serve society well not by adopting the quantified values
of the market but by preserving a realm where the nonquantifiable values of
intellectual excellence and integrity, and the supporting moral principles of
nonrepression and nondiscrimination, flourish. In serving society well by preserving
such a realm, a university acts as an educator of officeholders rather than simply a
gatekeeper of office.
GUTMANN, supra note 73, at 183.
78. See, e.g., ROBERT O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD 79–81 (2008)
(describing several comments made by professors post-9/11 that raised the ire of state legislators,
alumni, and citizens-at-large to a much greater degree than they did among the administration and
faculty).
79. See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS (1991) (suggesting that various diversity and multiculturalism efforts instituted by
American universities, while well-intentioned, are ultimately misplaced and even
counterproductive); DAVID HOROWITZ, THE PROFESSORS: THE 101 MOST DANGEROUS
ACADEMICS IN AMERICA (2006) (arguing that the modern university has been politicized by
primarily left-leaning academics and stressing the need to remove political bias from higher
education); ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: A
BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES (1998) (complaining that many modern
universities curtail their students’ liberties by forcing upon them certain, mostly left-leaning,
ideological beliefs and suppressing dissent, particularly that which is socially or politically
unpopular). The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education carries on the tedious struggle,
fanning occasional trivial disputes about marginal student speech without intellectual value. See
FIRE: The Found. for Individual Rights in Educ., http://www.thefire.org/ (contending that various
universities have curtailed assorted forms of politically and socially controversial speech by
students and student organizations).
80. See id. at 92–94 (comparing the diminution of academic freedom during the McCarthy Era
and the period since 9/11). While these critics do express some understandable concerns, adequate
explanation of the intensity of their rhetoric will require a historian of political ideas possessing the
sensitivity to social psychology of a Richard Hofstadter. Cf. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 29–30 (1965) (“The paranoid
spokesman sees the fate of this [vast and sinister] conspiracy in apocalyptic terms—he traffics in the
birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is
always manning the barricades of civilization.”).
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individual teachers present all sides of controversial matters.81 Such political
intervention to correct university teaching would surely violate academic
freedom as a raw “governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a
university.”82
These campaigns have failed politically to achieve their stated goals; no
legislature or private board has instituted agencies to oversee faculty
appointments. But their charged portrayals of academic excess probably
have undermined public confidence in the integrity of teaching and
scholarship, and in university self-governance. Even some sophisticated
federal judges rely on these exaggerated accounts to urge active judicial protection for faculty “whose method or speech is found offensive by those who
usually dominate our institutions of higher learning.”83 In this environment,
fundamentalist, faux universities without academic freedom or serious academic life can rise to prominence,84 and state legislatures have gradually
withdrawn financial support from state universities.85 Both books under
review here deploy their neo-orthodoxy regarding academic freedom and its
underlying scholarly values to push back against demands for a new
approach to academic speech.
Finkin and Post’s response to calls for political balance relies on their
reinvigoration of the standard of professional autonomy stemming from the
1915 Declaration. Their discussion of Committee A cases concerning politically controversial material in the classroom casts their position as the
established academic tradition. As a rhetorical matter this seems like a good
move—it removes claims for autonomy from current ideological disputes.
Finkin and Post try to persuade us that Committee A considered all these
issues long ago within the terms of historic political controversies and
reached modest, responsible outcomes. They specifically argue that calls for
political balance are “flatly incompatible with a scholar’s accountability to
professional standards.”86 “Balance” may require biologists to present the
case for intelligent design despite a professional consensus that it lacks
validity. “The whole point of academic freedom is to insulate professional

81. The so-called Academic Bill of Rights and the political battles it engendered are discussed
in J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the “Four
Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 941–44 (2006).
82. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a discussion of a similar loss of
confidence in academic leaders by the judiciary, which has resulted in a decline in constitutional
academic freedom, see Byrne, supra note 52, at 132–33,.
83. Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 471 (2d Cir. 2001) (Cabranes, J., dissenting). The footnote
accompanying this casual disparagement justifies judicial activism against universities because of
“disheartening developments” and “the politicization of higher education” as chronicled in popular
books. Id. at 471 n.2.
84. See, e.g., University Bans Club for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A24
(reporting Liberty University’s banning of the College Democrats club due to its incompatibility
with the school’s conservative Christian principles).
85. See supra note 16.
86. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 103.
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judgments from this kind of crude political control. Academic freedom
obligates scholars to use disciplinary standards, not political standards, to
guide their teaching.”87
Finkin and Post plausibly show how an insistence on balance can
undermine the scholarly values that critics claim to care for. Their case
contains serious weaknesses, however. Their Committee A case discussions
do not give the reader enough information to judge whether they have
reported or assessed the facts and judgments fairly or have ignored internal
conflicts; as such, the case discussions can be dismissed as superficial
anecdotes. The explicit arguments against balance take up only relatively
easy issues, like creationism in a science class, rather than truly divisive
issues, like the ethics or constitutionality of a U.S. President authorizing
torture. Disciplinary norms may frame but do not settle many issues that
rage within a field; some methodological choices overlap substantially with
political values. While any external mandate or intrusive procedure to
promote “balance” surely threatens indispensible academic autonomy and
causes more harm than gain, Finkin and Post do not adequately consider
whether the professional ethics of teaching require some level of political
even-handedness in handling controversial matters when different positions
are consistent with scholarly criteria. The book more stakes a claim to the
value of the tradition than fully establishes that it settles contemporary
concerns.
Fish directly engages specific critics of the university, arguing that they
violate academic norms as much or more than the dreaded tenured radicals
they abhor. He has serious fun with claims associating postmodernism with
immorality and left-wing politics: “[P]ostmodernism is a series of arguments,
not a way of life or a recipe for action.”88 He skewers pundit William
Bennett, for example, arguing that, by calling for a reinstatement of truth and
honesty in history, Bennett “means a study of history that tells the same story
he and his friends would tell if they were in control of the nation’s history
departments.”89
This is great fun and convincing up to a point. Its weakness stems
from Fish’s reductive minimalism. At bottom, Fish’s defense of academic
autonomy rests on his claims that academic work does not engage larger
social issues. But, we cannot and should not confine the values served by
higher education to those that contribute directly to disciplinary goals, like
the prohibition of plagiarism.90 American universities were founded and
continue to embrace values not subsumed in disciplinary criteria. As
discussed above, the most persistent claim is that they foster democracy by

87. Id. at 103–04.
88. FISH, supra note 17, at 141.
89. Id. at 142.
90. Fish expressly argues that “the whole of academic morality” consists of those prohibitions
implicit in immanent rationality, such as against cheating, fraud, and plagiarism. Id. at 101–02.
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educating leaders to engage arguments on their merits rather than resort to
force or lies: the mutually supporting commitments of a liberal education and
liberal society. But most schools have other commitments as well. My own
institution has endeavored over many years to interpret its heritage as a
Catholic and Jesuit university with unstinting commitment to academic
freedom, arguably improving the education it offers because of those
values.91 Law schools, too, educate students for activity in the world, often
combining scholarly analysis of legal issues with skills development and an
ethical commitment to justice integral to professionalism.92
Fish ignores the extent to which the actual traditions of American
higher education neither can nor should be fully separate from public values.
Practically speaking, most constituents of universities may care as much or
more for the attachment to these values than for disciplinary norms. Critics
of undergraduate education persistently call for greater curricular coherence,
which requires some subordination of disciplinary norms to educational or
ethical goals.93 External criticisms of trends in scholarship or the quality of
teaching will not be silenced by Fish’s claims that academic work has no
bearing on society. The tension between disciplinary norms and social
demands has fueled the dynamism of American universities.94 Material and
moral support for teaching and scholarship depends on the belief that they
contribute to some notions of social good.
91. The Jesuit notions of cura personalis and “educating the whole person” represent the
antithesis of Fish’s exclusive concentration on disciplinary training. See Georgetown Univ.,
Mission and Ministry, http://www11.georgetown.edu/omm/spiritofgeorgetown.html. The significance of a Catholic and Jesuit identity for a modern university has been the subject of rich and
intense debate for many years. See JOHN C. HAUGHEY, WHERE IS KNOWING GOING? THE
HORIZONS OF THE KNOWING SUBJECT 61–87 (2009) (examining the history of and relationship
between the “Catholic intellectual tradition” and the “Catholic Sacred Tradition”); Joseph A.
Komonchak, The Catholic University in the Church, in CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES IN CHURCH AND
SOCIETY: A DIALOGUE ON EX CORDE ECCLESIAE 47–48 (John P. Langan ed., 1993) (suggesting that
there is a logical and ecclesiological rationale for academic liberty). Michael J. Buckley, for
example, argues that such schools necessarily have commitments to the free and open discussion of
all subjects and the promotion of justice. MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AS
PROMISE AND PROJECT: REFLECTIONS IN A JESUIT IDIOM 125–47 (1998).
92. The American Bar Association accredits law schools and requires that every school provide
substantial instruction in professional ethics and substantial opportunities for pro bono
representation of low-income people. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2009–2010 ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 21–23 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/
2009-2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf. My law school’s motto is carved on the
exterior wall of the library: “Law is but the means—Justice is the end.” Georgetown Law—The
E.B. Williams Law Library (Campus Tour), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/tour/library.html (last
revised Jan. 21, 2005).
93. See, e.g., ERNEST L. BOYER, COLLEGE: THE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA
83–101 (1987) (calling for a more coherent curriculum that relates general education to different
subject-matter disciplines and the outside world).
94. Former Yale President Giamatti warned that universities that seek to be “sanctuaries from
society” deserve scorn. A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, A FREE AND ORDERED SPACE: THE REAL
WORLD OF THE UNIVERSITY 50 (1990) (“To wish only to be removed from the culture, and not to
be part of its renewal, is to long for the atrophy, not the exercise, of the imagination and its
works.”).
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The inevitable and desirable entanglement of higher education with
social goals and values makes academic freedom even more important.
Entrusting the evaluation of teaching and scholarship to disciplinary peers
provides insulation (not isolation) for intellectual accomplishment from the
pursuit of moral or practical ends by trustees or administrators. Academic
freedom provides a safety valve regulating the interplay between disciplinary
criteria and the broader concerns of the university, protecting the highly
structured search for scholarly truth that engenders intellectual integrity to
multifarious projects of the modern university. The absence of hierarchical
command and the lateral distribution of authority required by academic freedom render any integration of disciplinary criteria and educational or social
values only partial and periodic. Ordinary academic work needs to and can
go forward without interference, but academics occasionally do need to argue
beyond their fields that their work has both intellectual merit and social
value. This dialogue is explicit in the scientific grants process and also implicit in the legal control of universities by nonacademics. Tension among
the goals of higher education has mostly been creative, and academic
freedom protects intellectual integrity from being overwhelmed by more
immediate or popular concerns.
IV. Legal Implications: The Paradox of Garcetti
While neither book purports to wrestle with legal issues as such, their
treatment of the norm of academic freedom has important implications for its
constitutional status. As indicated above, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Garcetti tees up the question whether the First Amendment protects faculty
from reprisals by their institutions for speech within the duties of their job.95
The Court there held that a county prosecutor would not be protected from
adverse actions by his superiors in the office in response to a “disposition
memo” prepared as part of his official duties.96 The Justices thus established
another limitation on the right of a public employee to address matters of
public concern without reprisals by their government employer.97 In dissent,
Justice Souter expressed the “hope that today’s majority does not mean to
imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges
and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant
to . . . official duties.’”98 The Court in response, however, explicitly saved
for future consideration whether such a limitation on the scope of employee
95. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“There is some argument that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.”).
96. Id. at 424.
97. See id. (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
98. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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freedom of speech should apply to academic scholarship or teaching.99 A
few lower courts have applied the Garcetti rule to professors without discussing the Supreme Court’s reservation about doing so, but only in the
context of governance disputes rather than in teaching or scholarship.100
Both Finkin and Post’s and Fish’s books help explain why the teaching
and scholarship of a university professor enjoy a different relation to First
Amendment values than does the speech of other professionals working
within hierarchical public organizations. Garcetti assumes plausibly that
many supervisors need to control the speech of their subordinates, so speech
within the sphere of one’s employment lacks the values attributed to speech
by citizens.101 Fish illuminates how the different nature of a professor’s job
requires a different structure of authority:
The limited freedom academics do enjoy follows from the task they
perform.
That task—extending the boundaries of received
knowledge—does not have a pre-established goal; the open-endedness
of intellectual inquiry demands a degree of flexibility not granted to
the practitioners of other professions, who must be responsive to the
customer, or to the bottom line, or to the electorate, or to the global
economy.102
Scholarship is carried out by highly trained individuals employing
methodology and responding to prior work within (or near) organized
disciplines, and subjecting the product to professional criticism and peer
review. A professor cannot be considered an organ of the state; indeed, a
scholar’s primary duty is to the truth, which would be betrayed by following
any official state line established by any superior. The 1915 Declaration

99. See id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.”).
100. Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2008) (characterizing Renken’s speech
as that of a public employee rather than a private citizen because registering a grant falls within the
teaching and service duties that he was employed to perform); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158,
1165–66 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (defining the key issue as whether Hong’s statements were made
pursuant to his official duties as a faculty member, without first questioning whether faculty
members should be evaluated under the Garcetti rule). In Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir.
2009), the court applied the Garcetti rule to a professor’s statements in various governance and
administrative disputes, finding that his “actions so clearly were not ‘speech related to scholarship
or teaching,’” and noting that “such a determination here does not ‘imperil First Amendment
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.’” Id. at 186 (quoting Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 425; id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)). The extension of
Garcetti to universities threatens shared governance. See Areen, supra note 66, at 1000
(“[Extending] the holding of Garcetti to faculty at public colleges and universities [will] thereby
effectively eliminate constitutional protection for their scholarship, teaching, and governance
activities.”).
101. Dean Post has written several sophisticated articles explicating the differences for First
Amendment purposes between the realms of public discourse and that of government managerial
authority. E.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
102. FISH, supra note 17, at 81–82.
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expressed this sense that professors do not serve within a chain of command,
insisting that they are “appointees” not “employees.”103 Professors’ work
requires independent judgment and expression, subject to evaluation by peers
who apply academic criteria that largely transcend any local peculiarities, the
cosmopolitan standards for an academic discipline practiced across the nation
and often around the world. Hierarchical control of speech defeats the goals
of scholarship and liberal education, so universities have quite different
systems for coordination of effort.
The Garcetti formulation turns the principle of academic freedom on its
head. The First Amendment, as expounded in Garcetti, protects only a
public employee’s speech as a citizen outside professional duties.104
Academic freedom essentially protects only academic speech within the
sphere of a professor’s professional responsibilities; any extension to the
professor’s speech as a citizen outside his or her professional duties is derivative and debatable. Fish captures the nub of this in his argument that when
professors speak on topics outside their academic competence, they have no
more claim to authority than anyone else; thus, academic freedom should
give them no more and no less liberty than anyone else.105 While professors
at public universities long have enjoyed the same First Amendment
protections for extramural speech as other public employees, academic
freedom addressed the conditions necessary for success in teaching and
scholarship, the core of professional duties. No wonder the Supreme Court
hesitated! From this perspective, the Garcetti rule perversely eviscerates
academic freedom by depriving it of any constitutional protection.
Finkin and Post take a somewhat different tact; they argue that
academic freedom does protect the “extramural” speech of an academic from
institutional reprisal.106 Their view tracks the AAUP position, which has
evolved from some waffling in the 1915 Declaration, when the First
Amendment did not protect any speech by government employees, to its
definite 1970 interpretation that “a faculty member’s expression of opinion
as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for the position.”107 Finkin and Post
incorporate citizen speech within academic freedom because professors at
private universities cannot invoke the First Amendment against their
institutions.108 They forthrightly acknowledge that the rationales for
academic freedom itself, professional competence and autonomy, do not

103. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 295 (proclaiming that members of university
faculties are the appointees, rather than the employees, of the university trustees).
104. 547 U.S. at 421.
105. FISH, supra note 17, at 82.
106. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that First Amendment rights and academic
freedom are separate rights, and that extramural speech is a distinct dimension of academic
freedom).
107. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 6.
108. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 132–33.
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directly justify protection of speech outside a professor’s realm of
competence.109 Rather, they argue that extending academic freedom to
extramural speech provides “prophylactic protection” for core freedom in
scholarship and teaching; it fosters a “climate of trust and autonomy
necessary for faculty to contribute optimally to the mission of higher
education.”110 While this argument has practical merit, it recognizes, as does
Fish’s, that academic freedom arises from and has been shaped by
professional requirements for teaching and scholarship.
So the Garcetti limitation would seem to be inconsistent with academic
freedom. But the issue is not that simple. The freedom that citizens have
under the First Amendment also may be inconsistent with academic freedom,
which not only tolerates but requires that peers evaluate the quality of speech
on the merits and penalize professionally those found lacking. Finkin and
Post recognize that the professional criteria for academic speech, requiring
methodological care, hardly resembles the “‘uninhibited, robust, and wideopen’ speech that characterizes the public debate of citizens.”111 They argue
further that the First Amendment presumes that every person has an equal
right of expression, but “this premise is inconsistent with the advancement of
knowledge, which requires precisely that ideas be treated unequally, that they
be assessed and weighted, accepted and rejected. The kind of individual
freedom that underlies the structure of the First Amendment is . . . ill suited
to the production of knowledge.”112 Within academic freedom, individual
teachers are subject to “retaliation” for weaknesses in speech within their
professional duties, so long as the judgment is made by academic peers pursuant to appropriate procedures.113 Both books stress the inherently
professional purposes and limitations of academic freedom, demonstrating
that it arises from the logic of scholarly and educational purposes rather than
being deduced from the principles that justify free-speech protections for
citizens in a democracy. That is the neo-orthodoxy that they revive, which
restores the coherence of academic freedom. Entrusting the elaboration and
application of such inherently academic principles to judges and juries
threatens the intellectual system that the principles exist to foster.
The public-employee free-speech cases before Garcetti frequently were
absurd, as courts and juries struggled to decide whether some professor’s
writing or utterance touched on a matter of “public concern.”114 But this is

109. Id. at 135–36.
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id. at 135 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
112. Id. at 43.
113. See id. at 59 (explaining how universities employ peer-review procedures in making hiring
and tenure decisions).
114. See Byrne, supra note 52, at 108–09 (detailing the inconsistent application of the “public
concern” test). Compare Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“[C]lassroom instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court’s broad conception of ‘public
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the wrong question being answered by the wrong persons. Academic freedom insists that academic work be evaluated only for its professional value
by other scholars competent to make such a judgment. These First
Amendment cases bring academic work to the bar of public opinion, but the
thrust of academic freedom is to protect it from the force of public opinion.
As Finkin and Post state, “[T]here is a fundamental distinction between
holding faculty accountable to professional norms and holding them accountable to public opinion. The former exemplifies academic freedom; the latter
undermines it.”115
Of course, constitutional adjudication involves more than public
opinion. But the First Amendment, interpreted by judges and applied by
juries, will slight academic values in favor of civic values. For this reason, I
long have argued that constitutional academic freedom protects primarily the
university as an institution from government interference with core academic
functions.116 Thus, the academic freedom of the individual professor should
be left to nonlegal academic and institutional arrangements, such as the
tenure system; the investigations and judgments of Committee A of AAUP;
and the professional incentives and ethics of professors, academic
administrators, and even trustees.117 Legalizing disputes about the appropriateness of teaching and scholarship empowers their resolution by
nonacademics. Judges can protect the system of academic freedom by
protecting the institutional autonomy of universities from inappropriate intrusions by political actors. When they settle disputes among academics about
collective and individual authority, such as departmental control over
curriculum or grading, or the reasonableness of tenure decisions, they tend to
replace academic with civic norms.118
The remedial purpose of adjudication also may be unsuitable for the
vindication of academic freedom. Both books emphasize that academic freedom protects the system of scholarship and teaching rather than protecting
the individual interests of each professor. Finkin and Post state, “If the First
Amendment protects the interests of individual persons to speak as they
wish, academic freedom protects the interests of society in having a
professoriat that can accomplish its mission.”119 Fish argues that a teacher
“violates academic freedom by deciding to set aside academic purposes for

concern.’”), with Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1443 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (“Course content is
not a matter of public concern.”).
115. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 154.
116. Byrne, supra note 6, at 255.
117. Id. at 307–11.
118. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 154 (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between
holding faculty accountable to professional norms and holding them accountable to public
opinion.”). Judicial scrutiny of a professor’s nonprofessional speech against institutional retaliation
ordinarily does not threaten peer review.
119. Id. at 39.
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others thought to be more noble or urgent.”120 This tilt is strongly evident in
Committee A reports, which examine and recommend changes in institutional decision-making processes rather than seek remedies for wronged
individuals. The system of academic freedom is more important than any
individual professor. Redressing wrongs to individuals is humane but not
necessary to preserve the functioning of the beneficial system.121 Employing
an outside force such as a court may secure redress in one case but weaken or
destroy the system.
Garcetti may provide the right rule for professional speech by
professors, but for reasons different than those for hierarchical organizations.
Academic freedom as a norm and practice already protects individual professors from arbitrary or politically motivated retaliation. The exemplary
Committee A reports recounted by Finkin and Post demonstrate how well
academics can resolve their own disputes. First Amendment litigation risks
bringing unsuitable principles and practices to bear on a well-functioning
informal system.
Finkin and Post, nonetheless, likely would resist
Garcetti—and for good reasons. Although we largely agree on the neoorthodox principles that justify academic freedom, they take a different
approach to implementing them. While they justifiably extol the virtues of
Committee A’s work, AAUP leaders know the practical barriers to fostering
academic freedom without judicial protection. Faculty at leading institutions
take it for granted, while many of those at more marginal institutions serve as
adjuncts without the protections of tenure or even regularity.122 The AAUP
has been weakened. Economic pressures encourage institutions to curtail
faculty privileges, promote “business methods,” and fear conflict with
funders.123 Indeed, their book can be read as an attempt to salvage the

120. FISH, supra note 17, at 81.
121. A university that adheres to academic freedom, of course, must provide academic due
process to individuals through peer review and faculty-grievance procedures. See generally AM.
ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM & TENURE (2006), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/43B77A60-BA80-4155-B61BFF76743B5048/0/RecommendedInstitutionalRegulationsonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf
(outlining the AAUP’s model tenure, grievance, and dismissal procedures).
122. See EMILY FORREST CATALDI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2004 NATIONAL STUDY OF
POSTSECONDARY FACULTY: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS, WORK ACTIVITIES, AND
COMPENSATION OF INSTRUCTIONAL FACULTY AND STAFF: FALL 2003, at 7 tbl.1, 13 tbl.7 (2005)
(reporting that only 5% of part-time faculty have any tenure opportunity, and that the percentages of
part-time faculty in various institutions were 22% at public doctoral institutions, 31% at private notfor-profit doctoral institutions, 37% at public master’s and private not-for-profit baccalaureate
institutions, 55% at private not-for-profit master’s institutions, 67% at public associate’s
institutions, and 51% at all other types of institutions); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom of PartTime Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 583, 592 (2001) (“Part-time faculty cannot enjoy as full a protection
for academic freedom as do full-time faculty . . . because they are too far removed from the system
of peer review.”).
123. See, e.g., Naomi Schaefer Riley, Tenure and Academic Freedom: College Campuses
Display a Striking Uniformity of Thought, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at A3 (describing a failed
plan by the Metropolitan College of Denver to ease the firing of tenured professors to control
education costs).
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principles that have animated the AAUP’s approach to academic freedom for
application in new contexts.
Although these books well serve academic freedom by clarifying the
values upon which it is based and the purposes that it serves, neither offers a
sense of how to strengthen and preserve that system. Fish offers little more
than arguments to individuals about how to behave. His interest in
institutional arrangements amounts to arguments that administrators should
pretend to listen to faculty and that faculty should treat administrators more
respectfully. He does not offer helpful suggestions about how to provide
incentives or compel academics to abide by the academic ideals he
passionately advocates. Although they are legal experts, Finkin and Post also
concentrate on principles. Their discussion of process and jurisdiction is
backward-looking to what the AAUP has accomplished. The effectiveness
of what they accomplished leaves us wanting all the more their detailed
engagement with the institutional choices that can safeguard those principles.
The looming question posed by Garcetti of the relation between our
tradition of academic freedom and the First Amendment makes the need to
address these issues acute. Those who worry that judicial enforcement of
individual academic freedom against public institutions will undermine the
values intended to be protected need most to suggest alternatives. Here are a
few suggestions. First, judicial enforcement of constitutional academic
freedom as a right of universities themselves to be free from political
interference in their core academic functions creates space where academics
can govern those matters embraced by our tradition of academic freedom.
Second, this right of institutional autonomy can be shaped to provide
incentives for the governors of universities to adhere to the tradition of
academic freedom. For example, I have argued that a systematic institutional
failure to follow the tradition of academic freedom should deprive an
institution of the status of a university and the constitutional shield that
accompanies it.124 Third, faculty members must either support the reform
efforts of the AAUP or create a new organization to perform its vital
functions. As noted above, membership in AAUP has decreased, and some
feel that its unionization efforts are inconsistent with its role as guardian of
academic freedom.125 Nonetheless, the AAUP has taken significant steps
recently to address these issues.126 Although some disciplinary associations,
such as the Association of American Law Schools, have made useful efforts

124. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 338 (“[C]onstitutional academic freedom ought not to protect
institutions resembling universities but which do not . . . respect the academic freedom of
professors . . . or the essential intellectual freedom of students . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 15 (“Others believe that the AAUP’s union activities corrupt
its high-minded professional policies [such as protecting academic freedom].”).
126. See generally Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Resources on Academic Freedom,
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/newsroom/ (providing recent policy statements, reports, and analysis
on pressing issues).
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to address academic freedom,127 faculty need an organization that transcends
disciplines and holds academic freedom as its central mission in engaging
with ever larger and more powerful higher-education administrations. Those
who think courts are the answer should address the concern expressed ably
by the 1915 Declaration itself, that judgments about the scope of academic
freedom should not “be vested in bodies not composed of members of the
academic profession.”128
V.

Conclusion

American universities are dazzlingly diverse, full of conflicting
purposes, and the envy of the world.129 Our norm of academic freedom has
grown out of the needs and power structures of our universities to safeguard
the intellectual excellence at the core of their success. Rather than a civil
liberty or an individual interest, academic freedom systematically preserves
the precedence of professional judgment about what counts as success in
scholarship and teaching. As such it protects knowledge and the search for
truth, as well as we can collectively establish it. The academic work of a
university provides an exemplar for a liberal society, which values addressing issues on the merits and supporting leaders who appropriately
acknowledge facts and respond to conflicting arguments.
The books under review make impressive contributions to
understanding academic freedom and its relation to the search for truth.
Finkin and Post hold out reasonable hope that the traditional approach of the
AAUP to controversies about academic freedom provides enduring principles that preserve professional standards while permitting individual
creativity and adapting to new methods. I wish they had gone further in
defending their approach and placing it within current controversies and
institutional arrangements. Fish argues for a faculty role limited to performing core professional competencies, the better to exclude from academic
decision making those with political agendas. While he is half right—we
must teach our subjects as matters of intellectual inquiry—he unjustifiably
denies much that makes university education valuable to students and to
society at large. Both books clarify what is distinct and precious about
academic freedom, and we need to get those principles right to successfully
apply them in law or new institutional structures.

127. The AALS Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure investigates complaints in a
manner analogous to that of Committee A of the AAUP, but its proceedings are largely confidential.
See Executive Committee Regulations of the Association of American Law Schools, ch. 4,
http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations.php#4 (providing the Committee’s procedures for
resolving complaints).
128. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 174.
129. Drew Gilpin Faust, The University’s Crisis of Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/books/review/Faust-t.html.

